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In the context of the CCC, we usually do our vulnerability disclosures responsibly. So we ensure that a vulnerability is closed or at least disclosed to the responsible entity for a certain amount of time before discussing it publicly. The practice of responsible disclosure is more than two decades old and has become the gold standard in handling vulnerabilities as a security researcher.
On the other hand, responsible disclosure often also minimizes a vulnerability's impact in public debates and, therefore, is an excellent way to keep everybody safe. Still, it also reduces the usefulness of security research as a method of direct action.
In this talk, I would like to explain based on two examples (the ID-Wallet as well as the Bonify case) in which cases I think the impact of a vulnerability can be maximized by shitposting it on Twitter while keeping everyone - except Jens Spahn and Helge Braun - safe.