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This talk is based on a one-year long research conducted at Citizen Lab , using a mixed methods approach. On the one hand, we conducted network measurements with OONI probe , testing a set of URLs from Crimean vantage points, and comparing results with mainland Russia and Ukraine. We have done an analysis of BGP routing history, and AS neighbouring history, using data from RIPE and CAIDA in collaboration with researchers behind the "Internet Health Report" initiative  using the recently deployed methodology of "AS Hegemony Index" . On the other hand, we conducted an extensive qualitative study, including interviews with Crimean ISPs, Ukrainian and Russian tech activists and representatives of RIPE and other Internet governance bodies; web-ethnography (analysis of professional chats and forums of Crimean / Ukrainian ISPs) and media analysis.
We will briefly introduce the context of annexation from the point of view of Internet infrastructure, show an interactive timeline of events that have impacted Crimean Internet ecosystem. Then we will focus on the case of "Infrastructure interregnum", where Ukrainian and Russian traffic co-existed for a while. We will share our infographics, including video animation that demonstrates progressive "wiring" of Crimea to "Russian Internet". On the case of several Ukrainian ISPs we will show how routing becomes matter of dispute. We will question the role of international sanctions and geoblocking by Google, Apple and other big players, on Crimean Internet. Finally, we will conclude with observations of the effects of this infrastructure transition on the end-users, especially activists and journalists working in the region, in terms of their security and the way they experience censorship.
We will also share our website [currently under final revisions, will be open to public by October 31, 2018] that presents results of our research in an accessible form for non-tech and non-academic audiences, but also contains longer reports and links for data and infographics that are open for downloading for further reusage, recycling and reading.
 [Dalek et al., 2014] J. Dalek, B. Haselton, H. Noman, A. Senft, M. Crete-Nishihata, P. Gill, and R. J. Deibert. A method for identifying and confirming the use of URL filtering products for censorship. In 14th ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), 2014.
 Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary research laboratory based at the University of Toronto, Canada. Citizen Lab studies information controls—such as network surveillance and content filtering—that impact the openness and security of the Internet.
 Romain Fontugne, Anant Shah, and Emile Aben. 2017. AS Hegemony: A Robust Metric for AS Centrality. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM Posters and Demos ’17, Los Angeles, CA, USA, August 22–24, 2017, 3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3123878.3131982