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In recent years the internet of things has slowly creeped into our daily life and is now an essential part of it, whether you want it or not. A long-existing sub category of the internet of things is a mysterious area called teledildonics. This term got invented about 40 years ago and described (at this time fictional) devices, allowing their users to pleasure themselves, while being interconnected to a global network of plastic dongs. In the 21st century, teledildonics actually exist. Multiple devices are on the (multi-million dollar) market, offering the ability to pleasure an individual, while being connected to the internet. Those devices offer functionalities, like remote pleasuring over local links as well as over the internet. They implement social media-like functionalities such as friends lists, instant messaging, movie chats and explicit-image sharing.
With great pleasure comes great responsibility. A responsibility, which is not taken enough into consideration by the smart sex toy manufacturers as they should, while handling extremely sensitive data. As long as there is no serious breach, there is no problem, right?
This was the basis for a research project called “Internet of Dildos, a long way to a vibrant future”, dealing with the assessment of smart sex toys and identification of vulnerabilities in those products, including mobile apps, backends and the actual hardware.
After the assessment of a selection of multiple smart sex toys an abyss of vulnerabilities was revealed. The identified vulnerabilities range from technically interesting vulnerabilities to vulnerabilities which affect the privacy of the users in extreme and explicit ways. It was possible to gain access to thousands of users’ data records, including cleartext passwords, explicit images, real-world names, real-world addresses, and many more specific facts. Furthermore, we were able to remotely pleasure individuals without their consent over the internet, or over a local link.
Explanation as to why it is necessary to conduct penetration tests in the area of teledildonics and why the topic was chosen for further research.
2. Quick introduction into basics like
Internet of Things (IoT)
Teledildonics (History of Smart Sex Toys)
Internet of Dongs (IoD)
3. The “Test Devices”
A quick introduction of the test devices examined during this project.
Explanation of their feature set including areas of application and use-cases.
4. Let’s get dirty – An overview of the identified vulnerabilities
DS_STORE File Information Disclosure
Customer Database Credential Disclosure
Unrestricted Access to administrative interfaces
Weird authentication implementation
Unauthenticated Bluetooth LE Connections
Missing Authentication in Remote Control
And many more…
5. Bluetooth LE Protocol exploitation
Brief overview over Bluetooth LE security features
Brief overview over Bluetooth LE authentication/pairing methods
Brief overview over Bluetooth LE exploitation Hardware
Brief overview over Bluetooth LE exploitation Software
6. The “Swinger Club Problem”
How the manufacturers tried to downplay the vulnerabilities.
7. Legal Issues – Rape over the wire?
How are current laws dealing with sexual pleasure without consent over the internet?
8. Responsible Disclosure Process
Coordinated vulnerability remediation with the German CERT-Bund
9. Ongoing/Similar Research
Attendees are made aware that not a single category of devices in the internet of things is secure, no matter how obscure and outlandish the device might be. This should also raise attention and motivation to test all those devices that are already out there and handle the Internet of Things more cautiously.
Another important takeaway is to raise attention to how poorly programmed many IoT devices are and how it is still possible to discover vulnerability cases, which should be resolved and extinct.
Last but not least, we want to take the opportunity to discuss and raise attention to the hot topic of “remote rape” or how our current legislature deals with remote pleasuring without consent.
Why this talk?
First and foremost, this talk will be a lot of fun while teaching the audience how to assess smart sex toys and penetrate their backends (pun intended). The audience will learn what an attacker is capable of when attacking smart sex toys, nowadays. Furthermore, the audience will get deep insights into Bluetooth LE penetration testing including a hands-on example on a selected smart sex toy.
Most of the identified vulnerabilities [1, 2, 3, 4] identified to this day include minor backend issues and or the good old exploitation of the Bluetooth LE protocol. The major difference compared to this research is, that the SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab identified a potential massive breach of data, including explicit images, clear text passwords, etc) via the “publicly” accessible database, as well as the issue with the remote pleasuring without consent, which is a so called “Feature”.