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<p>Fast forward to 2035. Stasi 2.0 has risen to power and has decided that, to protect society, anyone who has ever been exposed to alternative music will be sent to a „better place“. They still have a copy of Karen’s ciphertext. And here’s the really bad news: They’ve just finished building a billion-qubit quantum computer.</p>
<p>Back in 2015, large general-purpose quantum computers haven’t been built yet, but the consensus is that they will be built, and that they will allow well-funded attackers to retroactively break practically all of today's deployed public-key cryptography.
RSA will be dead.
ECC will be dead.
DSA will be dead.
„Perfect forward secrecy“, despite its name, won’t help.
<p>Fortunately, there are replacement public-key cryptosystems
that have held up very well against analysis of possible attacks,
including future quantum attacks.
This talk will take a hands-on look at the two examples
with the longest track records: namely, hash-based signatures (Merkle trees) and code-based encryption (McEliece).
<p>The talk will be given as a joint presentation by Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange.</p>